Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is seeing a noteworthy shift, with a growing number of senior positions now occupied by National Intelligence Organization (MIT) officers and political appointees. This transformation is reshaping the ministry’s traditional role, aligning it more closely with intelligence and security functions than with conventional diplomatic practices.
Fidan, who served as the head of MIT before his appointment as foreign minister in 2023, has brought several MIT officers into influential positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Notably, of the 32 general directorates within the ministry, 16 are reportedly led by individuals with MIT backgrounds, with only 11 headed by the career diplomats and 5 by the political appointees. This shift in personnel structure suggests that an intelligence mindset is gaining priority within the ministry’s core leadership.
The former Security and Research Directorate has also been restructured and expanded as the Intelligence and Security General Directorate, enhancing the ministry's capacity for coordinating with intelligence agencies. On the other hand, the Directorate General of Diplomatic Security (DGGM) has been established through Presidential Executive Decision No. 163 in September. The DGGM is primarily tasked with protecting Turkey’s diplomatic missions abroad, which were previously handled by law enforcement agencies. Its mandate includes managing diplomatic couriers and secure cross-border transportation of materials, along with cybersecurity.
The DGGM also has the authority to request equipment and resources from other government agencies, including the Ministries of Interior and Defense. This provision effectively grants the DGGM access to weapons, with significant autonomy. Article 6(e) of the executive decision further authorizes the DGGM to conduct security training for both public employees and other people approved by the foreign minister, as in an intelligence agency.
The restructuring in the ministry includes an increase in the number of deputy ministers, rising from three to five, with three of these positions filled by political appointees. These political deputies now oversee critical portfolios, including regions like the Middle East and Asia, covering critical countries for Turkey such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The pro-government think tank SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) holds the lion’s share of top positions in the ministry, with two deputy ministers. One of them, Nuh Yılmaz, had served in MIT with Fidan before following him to the Foreign Ministry.
It is common for foreign ministries to have officials with intelligence backgrounds involved in diplomatic activities or holding senior positions, and vice versa. Nonetheless, in Turkey, nearly half of senior positions are now filled by former intelligence operatives. On the lower levels, anecdotal reports also indicate that intelligence officers in Turkish embassies now wield significant influence, much like the military attachés of the 1990s, further diminishing the ministry’s diplomatic function.
Implications for Turkey’s Diplomatic Approach
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its intelligence agency, MIT, have traditionally operated with distinct responsibilities in foreign affairs. The Foreign Ministry was expected to provide insight and recommendations on international developments impacting Turkey’s foreign policy, ideally without becoming entangled in domestic political agendas. In contrast, MIT has primarily focused on surveilling citizens of Turkish origins living abroad, particularly those deemed a threat by the government. (Whether this practice would be tolerated in a well-functioning democracy is an entirely different question.)
The dominance of MIT personnel and political appointees within the senior positions of the Foreign Ministry, coupled with the expanded mandate of the DGGM raises questions about the future direction of the roles of Turkey’s institutions in foreign policy. In this context, the Foreign Ministry’s discourse and approach have become more security-oriented in recent years, as reflected in its strategic plans and its suspected role in transnational repression. Turkish embassies have allegedly been involved in identifying, surveilling, and, in some cases, even facilitating the abduction of individuals viewed as opponents of the Turkish government, such as incidents in Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, and Switzerland. This type of operation has caused frictions, frictions, especially with Western countries that are worried with foreign intelligence activities and the surveillance of their residents by a third country on their soil.
The intelligence community has a distinct way of conducting operations and values, designed to provide information and insight that must be kept separate from diplomatic channels. By prioritizing intelligence over diplomacy, Turkey risks narrowing its foreign policy toolkit. This will further undermine Turkey’s diplomatic capabilities.
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