The Damascus-SDF Agreement: Promises Made, But the Devil Is in the Details

In a landmark agreement, the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have reached a deal on March 10. At the heart of the deal is the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state. Nonetheless, the agreement’s intentionally vague language on military integration suggests that key issues remain unresolved, with implications for Turkey and the US.  

While the agreement signals a willingness for cooperation between the Syrian government and the SDF, its success depends on implementation. The insurgency in western Syria and the massacre of over one Alawite civilians last week underscore HTS’s inability to fully control the country or its armed factions. To solidify its legitimacy, HTS needed the political backing of the second-largest armed group in Syria—the SDF. 

Control Over Oil and Gas: A Win for Damascus

The most crucial aspect of the deal is Article 4, which mandates that all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria—including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields—be placed under state control. This provision represents an achievement for the government in Damascus, as it secures access to vital resources needed for post-war reconstruction.

For months, the SDF has insisted that it must be integrated into the Syrian army rather than dissolved. The new agreement acknowledges this demand but does not provide a clear framework for how the YPG, the SDF’s military wing, will be incorporated into Syria’s armed forces. The SDF has argued that YPG fighters must remain a cohesive unit and be deployed in eastern Syria. However, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, has been reluctant to accommodate another powerful military force within the country. The vague wording in the agreement suggests that full consensus has not yet been reached on this issue, making future negotiations crucial. A committee will later decide the modalities of this military integration. 

Implications for Turkey and the US

Turkish President Erdoğan cautiously welcomed the agreement, stating: "The full implementation of the agreement reached yesterday in Syria will contribute to the country’s security and stability. The beneficiaries of this will be all our Syrian brothers and sisters." While the deal may ease Turkey’s security concerns, particularly regarding the SDF’s presence along its border, it does not fully satisfy Ankara’s demands. The YPG remains intact, a terrorist organization according to Turkey, and its structure within the Syrian military is still uncertain. However, Turkey’s resolve against the YPG offers al-Sharaa leverage in future negotiations. 

On the other hand, the full implementation of this deal will eventually necessitate the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Syria. Turkey has justified its military presence in Syria with self-defense and counterterrorism. If the YPG integrates into the Syrian army, the raison d’être of its armed intervention will cease to exist. Now, any future Turkish military intervention in Syria may lead to a direct confrontation with the Syrian army in Damascus, as the YPG will be operating under its banner. The modality of the integration may thus undermine cooperation between Turkey and Syria, as Ankara will refrain from taking initiatives that could bolster the YPG's fighting capabilities.

The deal would affect U.S. military presence in Syria. Currently, around 2,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the country. The U.S. deployment in Syria has two main objectives: ensuring the survival of the SDF, which played a key role in the fight against ISIS, and preventing the resurgence of ISIS by avoiding clashes between HTS and the SDF. The US military’s involvement in securing this deal highlights Washington’s interest in an orderly transition to secure these objectives. The United States has already announced plans to withdraw from Iraq next year, which would complicate logistical support for its forces in eastern Syria. In this vein, a smooth integration of the SDF into the Syrian government would likely accelerate the American withdrawal. 

The agreement also reduces the likelihood of a large-scale Turkish military operation against the YPG in eastern Syria, similar to those conducted in previous years. However, should the U.S. withdraw, Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria could increase. Without American forces acting as a buffer, Ankara would be able to exert direct military pressure on the SDF. 

If successfully implemented, this deal could unify Syria under a single political entity and contribute to long-term stability. Moreover, it may open the door for the eventual lifting of crippling sanctions on Syria, which have severely restricted the country’s economic recovery. However, the unresolved details of military integration and regional power struggles mean that significant challenges remain. 

For now, the deal represents a pragmatic compromise rather than a definitive resolution. If it holds, it could reshape Syria’s political and military balance, accelerate the U.S. withdrawal, and curb Turkey’s military ambitions in eastern Syria. But the devil is in the details, and the true test lies in its implementation.