Opinions

Iran built an extensive sphere of influence across the Middle East between 2003 and 2023. This influence has largely—at least for the time being—collapsed following the 2023 war in Gaza with Hamas, the 2024 conflict in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and the December 2024 fall of Syria’s Baath regime. Together, they formed the backbone of Iran’s regional influence.

The experience of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should be a warning for Venezuela’s opposition. Not because Syria and Venezuela are the same, but because they reveal how U.S. policy actually works when hard choices are made. In both cases, Washington has shown that it values stability and workable partners over past alliances or political sympathy. That logic matters far more than the specifics of either country.

The ceasefire signed on January 18 between Damascus and the SDF was not the product of prolonged bargaining or mutual compromise. It was imposed by developments on the ground that had already stripped the SDF of its bargaining power. As such, the ceasefire agreement formalizes the collapse of the March 10 deal and largely marks the end of the SDF’s ability to shape outcomes in Syria.

The protests in Iran are continuing to escalate. What started as a protest by traders against the fall in the value of the local currency, rising prices, economic mismanagement and worsening economic conditions in the country has quickly transformed into a growing movement for political change. This is evident from the chants of protestors and is threatening the legitimacy of the ruling clerical regime.

Videos showed fighting erupting in residential areas as civilians fled en masse, while green buses later transported defeated fighters out of the city under a mediated evacuation arrangement. The Aleppo clashes in early January 2026 brought back grim memories of Syria's civil war, even as the new government in Damascus, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, claimed another military win against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo.

Turkey’s Syria policy is often portrayed as a case of foreign policy failure driven by ideology. According to this view, Ankara abandoned realism in favor of Islamist enthusiasm during the Arab Spring and later returned to pragmatism after paying significant political and strategic costs. While this narrative highlights an important shift, it relies on a simplified understanding of the relationship between ideas and foreign policy.

Let me outline three possible scenarios for the post-Maduro era in Venezuela. I call them the “good,” the “bad,” and the “ugly.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has opened a new chapter in Turkish–Israeli relations. For a long time, the Assad regime was a major security concern for Turkey. For Israel, it was “the devil they knew.” Israel focused on containing the Assad regime and Iran’s proxies, while Turkey’s military presence in Syria remained a secondary issue.

On the eve of the civil war, Syria was a lower-middle-income country with steady growth and relatively stable macroeconomic indicators. Between 2000 and 2010, real GDP grew by an average of 4.8 percent annually, inflation averaged 4.9 percent. Trade accounted for 64 percent of GDP, and GDP per capita stood at 2,731 dollars in 2010.

Israel’s superior air power and strike capabilities during the 12-Day War exposed Iran’s structural weaknesses. Yet the consequences of this confrontation extend well beyond the battlefield. The war has acted as a catalyst, accelerating trends already present inside Iran and pushing the political system into a phase of recalibration. 

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) emerged as a dominant military and territorial actor in eastern Syria following the U.S.-led campaign against ISIS. Their control of large areas has created sustained tension with Turkey, which views the SDF as an extension of the PKK. Turkey’s opposition to an independent SDF military structure, alongside Damascus’s efforts to reassert authority in eastern Syria, has made the status of the YPG, the SDF’s armed wing, a central issue in the negotiations, including the most recent talks in December.

Draghi Raporu Avrupa için bir uyarıydı. Wennink Raporu ise bu uyarının Hollanda’ya düşen kısmını açıkça ortaya koyuyor. Hollanda bugün hâlâ güçlü bir ekonomi. Ancak bu güç, otomatik pilotta korunabilecek bir güç değil.