The Biden administration marked in a period of relative stability for Turkish-American relations, despite limited personal engagement between President Biden and Turkish President Erdoğan. While the absence of direct presidential rapport marked a significant departure from the Trump era’s personal diplomacy, institutional ties under Biden remained resilient and productive.
During the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, Biden’s sharp criticism of Turkey’s human rights record, particularly concerning the Kurds, raised questions about whether a further deterioration in Turkish-American relations lay ahead. In contrast, I anticipated a continuation of positive momentum between Ankara and Washington after few turbulent years.
I was partly wrong. I expected Biden to maintain a personal relationship with Erdogan. Nonetheless, Biden deliberately avoided cultivating such a personal relationship with Erdoğan, a significant departure from both his vice presidency and Trump’s overtures. In fact, Biden often made his low regard for Erdoğan clear, inviting him to the White House only during the final months of his presidency—a visit Erdoğan ultimately canceled likely because it was not flashy enough. However, although the leader-to-leader leg was missing in relations, Turkish-American relations performed relatively well, especially given the myriad challenges they faced.
Biden’s presidency prioritized a steady, pragmatic approach to Ankara. Diplomatic efforts thrived at the institutional level, with advisors, diplomats, and officials maintaining open channels of communication. This institutional diplomacy became a hallmark of the Biden era, effectively compartmentalizing contentious issues while enabling cooperation on key areas. For instance, the crisis surrounding Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids—a significant geopolitical objective for Washington—was managed with notable patience and calmness. It certainly strained relations. These two Baltic countries’ participation into NATO was going to be a significant geopolitical achievement against Russia. Unlike Trump, who resorted to public threats and insult against Erdogan, Biden avoided turning the issue into a public confrontation, instead relying on institutional channels to negotiate a resolution.
Even on sensitive matters like the Gaza conflict, which held the potential to derail relations, both sides demonstrated restraint. Although Erdogan has sometimes criticized Biden for his support to Israel, Washington did not react to these statements seriously. Institutional diplomacy facilitated compartmentalization, ensuring that broader bilateral relations remained intact despite disagreements.
This quasi-transactional nature of the relationship was key to this stability. Both sides acknowledged their divergent interests but prioritized cooperation where possible. For sure, Biden failed in pulling Turkey closer to the Western bloc. Turkey maintained its hedging policy in search for strategic autonomy. Also, the issues that trouble the Turkish-American relations for years, such as Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, the US partnership with Kurds in northern Syria, and CAATSA sanctions against Turkey continued to be unresolved during the Biden administration. On top of that the war in Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and Gaza were challenges that could each cause major breakdown between Ankara and Washington.
Ankara, for its part, signaled its commitment to this more stable approach by appointing a career diplomat as its ambassador to Washington, a departure from the politically-driven appointments of the past. This move may underscore Turkey’s recognition of the importance of steady institutional ties during a time when Erdoğan struggled to establish a personal connection with Biden.
Turkey also showed adaptability in its dealings with Washington. While Erdoğan’s rhetoric often diverged from Western positions, particularly regarding Russia and China, Ankara maintained cooperation on key issues, most notably Ukraine. Despite differences, the Biden administration and Turkey worked together to support Ukraine against Russian aggression, demonstrating the resilience of institutional collaboration.
In hindsight, the Biden era may not have been transformative, but it was quietly successful. Despite Erdoğan’s inability to forge a personal relationship with Biden, Turkish-American relations remained functional and pragmatic. The lack of direct engagement at the leadership level was compensated for by the strength of institutional ties, ensuring that collaboration persisted even amidst disagreements.
This period of steady diplomacy gives way to the more unpredictable dynamics of a Trump presidency. Erdogan’s personal relationship with Trump is much better than Biden. Although the Turkish government seems quite enthusiastic about Trump, it can miss the Biden era’s stability.
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