The Turkish government's measured response to the escalating tensions in the Middle East is strikingly different from its previous instances of vehement criticism against Israel during crises. In this current crisis, Turkey has pursued a diplomatic approach aimed at de-escalation, facilitating humanitarian aid access for Palestinian civilians. Nevertheless, the mounting tension, especially if Israel were to launch a ground operation in Gaza, could once again imperil the ongoing normalization efforts between the two countries.
Although Turkey strongly condemned the bombing of a hospital in Gaza and other civilian deaths in Palestine, those condemnations are muted compared to its response to Israel’s previous operations. The tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv did not stop after the 2009 Davos and 2010 flotilla crises. In 2011, Erdogan called Israel a spoiled child. He also said that Israel is a threat to the region since it has nuclear weapons. ‘They have even surpassed Hitler in barbarism,’ he said in 2014. Until recently, President Erdogan had persistently called Israel a ‘terrorist and occupier state’ alongside many other antisemitic insults. Interestingly, in criticizing airstrikes in Gaza this week, Erdogan called on Israel to act as a state. ‘Israel must remember that if it behaves like an organization and not like a state, it will end up being treated like an organization,’ Erdogan stated. It is noteworthy that he refrained from ‘terrorist organization.’
Turkish-Israeli relations have followed a bumpy course under the shadow of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Until the Davos crisis in 2009, relations continued to flourish despite some setbacks. In 2004, the assassination of Sheikh Yasin, Hamas leader, strained the relations. Erdogan accused Israel of ‘state terror’ and rejected the Israeli Prime Minister’s demand to meet. In 2008, the Turkish government attempted to mediate peace between Israel and Syria. Nevertheless, an Israeli operation against Gaza, which started in the middle of negotiations, caused disappointment and anger in Ankara. In 2009 and 2010, the relations hit rock bottom with a flotilla crisis in which Israeli special forces killed 9 Turkish citizens.
In 2016, both states tried to normalize their relations, and, in parallel with that, Erdogan softened his tone against Israel. For normalization, President Erdogan even forgone his condition of lifting Israeli blockage over Gaza and unplugged the criminal investigation against the Israeli soldiers who took part in the 2010 flotilla operation. President Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem and the following regional tension ruined the normalization efforts once more.
In October 2023, a new wave of Israeli-Palestinian tension is now threatening the latest attempt at diplomatic normalization between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Ankara is so far cautious in its statements. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan made visits to Egypt and Lebanon. He has even come up with an idea of guarantor states for the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Nevertheless, the Turkish diplomatic efforts have not received any attention from regional or global powers. Neither US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken nor President Biden visited Ankara in their recent Middle East tours.
For sure, the increase in tension may change Ankara’s attitude too. Although Islamist activism still supports Palestine and Hamas in Turkey, Erdogan’s AKP has not taken a notable initiative. The government declared three-day national mourning for the Palestinian deaths in Gaza but did not mobilize its base against Israel. So, indeed, pro-Palestine demonstrations were ‘far smaller’ in Istanbul, noted journalist Hannah Lucinda Smith. However, an Israeli ground operation, which is expected at any moment at the time of writing this article, and a growing civilian tragedy in Gaza may cause a new breakdown in Ankara-Tel Aviv relations. Indeed, the Israeli government has issued a travel warning about Turkey and designated the country as a ‘high threat’ destination – interestingly, higher than other Middle Eastern states.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the regional and global conditions are different than in the previous decade. Islamism and populism over the Palestinian cause do not promise the same potential as in the 2000s and 2010s. Islamism has been a revolutionary actor that would change the whole Middle East. Under the banner of the ‘Turkish model,’ Ankara hoped to benefit from Islamism for the pursuit of power and interest. To that end, Erdogan’s fiery discourse over Palestine provided him a personal influence and charisma in the Arab street. So, indeed, the Bush and Obama administrations treated Erdogan as a new Nasser who could control the masses in the Middle East.
However, although the Israel-Palestine crisis has become the top priority issue of the region and the world after October 7, blustering over the Palestinian cause does not promise the same potential today, at least for now. First, the regimes in the Middle East have already proven their strength against the revolutionary movements after the Arab Spring. Secondly, regional revisionism cost dearly to Turkish diplomacy and economy in the late 2010s. Thus, the Turkish government does not seem eager to pursue a new episode of revisionism in the region. Therefore, populism over the Palestinian cause does not promise much for President Erdogan except domestic politics.
Also, Ankara saw its normalization with Israel as a facilitator of Turkish-American reconciliation. Conversely, escalating tensions with Israel could exacerbate the already strained relationship with Washington and further cloud Turkey's image within the US Congress, which plays a crucial role in decisions like the sale of F16 fighter jets. While Ankara may not appear overly concerned about straining its ties with the US, the overall state of Turkish-American relations is likely to prompt President Erdogan to think twice before burning the bridges with Tel Aviv.
Since the first day of the Hamas attack, Turkey has struggled to tune a delicate political stance between Israel and Hamas. President Erdogan has reacted with restraint to Israel’s excessive use of force against civilian targets in Gaza. Even if a ground operation increases the regional tension, Ankara’s reaction is tuned with other regional actors like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, the Gazza operation will surely test the newly normalized Turkish-Israeli relations.
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