On September 4, 2024, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi made an official visit to Turkey, signaling a deepening of relations between Egypt and Turkey. During the first meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, Turkish President Erdogan referred to el-Sisi as "my dear brother," and the leaders displayed a level of cordiality that marked a significant departure from past tensions.
This rapprochement initially stemmed from Turkey’s urgent need to end its regional isolation. Over recent years, Ankara has worked to repair relations with key regional players, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and eventually Egypt. Cairo, seeking concessions on issues such as Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, was reluctant to develop ties. In 2023, for example, President el-Sisi canceled what would have been his first visit to Turkey, after attending the Africa-Russia summit in St. Petersburg, without offering any explanation. Erdogan, for his part, had to soften his rhetoric and reverse the harsh criticism he once directed toward el-Sisi. (Critics of Erdogan were quick to highlight on social media his previous statements condemning the Egyptian leader, contrasting them with the friendly tone struck during the visit.)
Nonetheless, recent geopolitical developments have altered the dynamics. Cairo, facing growing threats in its immediate neighborhood, no longer stands as the party unmotivated in this rapprochement. The "ring of fire" surrounding Egypt—marked by the civil war in Sudan to the south, enduring conflict in Libya to the west, and ongoing war in Gaza to the east—has reinforced Cairo’s need for reliable regional allies. Therefore, Turkey’s potential role in regional stabilization has become more appealing to Egypt’s strategic interests.
In this context, during the summit, President el-Sisi articulated Egypt’s concerns regarding the broader instability in the region, particularly in Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Somalia. In Libya, where Turkey and Egypt have historically supported opposing factions, the need for cooperation has become increasingly pressing, especially after recent tensions following the dismissal of the governor of the Libyan Central Bank on August 18, which led to the suspension of oil exports from Libya’s eastern regions.
Somalia is a theater where Egypt and Turkey have deepened their cooperation. Both nations have been working alongside the Somali government to manage regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa, particularly in relation to Somaliland's agreement with Ethiopia to provide port access to Addis Ababa. Egypt has bolstered its military presence in the region, sending supplies and preparing to deploy thousands of troops. This increased involvement raises the risk of heightened tensions with Ethiopia, especially considering the long-standing disagreements over the rights to use the Nile’s water.
Although formal military cooperation was not included in the agreements signed during the summit, there are clear indications of growing defense ties. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan previously confirmed that Egypt had expressed interest in acquiring Turkish armed drones. Such acquisitions could enhance Egypt’s military capabilities, particularly in light of potential escalations in Somalia and its ongoing disputes with Ethiopia.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was also on the agenda of the bilateral meeting. After the visit, the pro-government Turkish press underscored a common understanding between Turkey and Egypt in their opposition to Israel in support of Palestine. Nonetheless, President Erdogan reiterated his firm opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza, while Egypt took a more measured approach, reaffirming its support for a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state, without heavily criticizing Israel.
The discussions touched upon various sectors of potential collaboration, including trade, industry, defense, environmental policy, and energy. President Erdogan emphasized the opportunity for cooperation in natural gas and nuclear energy, as Turkey seeks to diversify its energy sources. Ankara’s interest in importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Egypt is part of a broader strategy to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. However, Egypt’s ability to meet Turkey’s LNG demands remains uncertain due to declining domestic gas production. In an effort to manage its domestic consumption and to increase gas exports, Egypt has been rationing electricity, raising concerns about the country’s long-term reliability as an energy supplier for Turkey.
Turkey and Egypt consider themselves islands of stability in a region where chaos reigns. Domestically, they face crippling issues, such as structural economic challenges, increased inequality, and deep social problems. This shared sense of insecurity will continue to drive Turkish-Egyptian relations, as both countries seek reliable partners to ensure stability and security in their “ring of fire.”
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