Grain Deal and Turkey’s Balancing Policy

September 7, 2023
by Haşim Tekineş, published on 7 September 2023
Grain Deal and Turkey’s Balancing Policy

Turkish President Erdogan failed to convince the Russian President to revive the Grain Deal during his visit to Sochi. Nonetheless, Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia continue to flourish, even amid Turkey's renewed cooperation with its Western allies. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine could create tension in their relationship and make it more difficult for Turkey to maintain a delicate balance between NATO and Russia.

Following Russia's withdrawal from the Grain Deal on July 17, Turkey has been making efforts to bring President Putin back to the negotiating table. In pursuit of this goal, Turkey extended invitations to Putin to visit Ankara on multiple occasions.  Notably, Putin has not visited Turkey in over three years, despite Erdogan making three visits to Russia during the same period. 

Meeting with Erdogan did not alter Putin's position on the Grain Deal. Putin maintains that the deal was unfair and characterized by deception under the guise of humanitarianism. During the press conference, he argued that the great majority of the grain went to developed countries, not to Africa. Yet, his condition to return to the deal is lifting the sanctions that the US and EU imposed upon Russia. 

Why the Deal Matters?

The Grain Deal is important to mitigate the externalities of the war in Ukraine. As Russia and Ukraine are two major grain suppliers of the world, the war impacts global food and energy prices. Thus, the deal played a crucial role in alleviating pressure on food prices. The Grain Deal, brokered by Turkey and the UN in July 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, allowed for the transporting of 33 million tons of grain to international markets. This deal significantly aided underdeveloped countries threatened by rising food prices. According to the UN, the deal led to a nearly 20 percent drop in global food prices.

Rather than resurrecting the original deal, Erdogan and Putin reached an agreement on a scaled-down version that permitted the shipment of 1 million tons of grain to underdeveloped countries. However, when compared to the scope of the original deal, 1 million tons falls short of meeting the needs and expectations. Therefore, Erdogan emphasized during the press conference that there is no replacement for the original deal.  

Moreover, the deal is a diplomatic achievement in a conflict where there are no peace talks on the horizon. Both sides appear more inclined to escalate the conflict rather than engage in dialogue. In this context, the deal can potentially build trust and provide a reliable foundation for diplomacy.

For Turkey, the deal is essential in legitimizing its amicable relations with Russia despite opposition from Western countries. Turkey has not adhered to the US and EU sanctions against Russia and has welcomed Russian capital fleeing Western markets. Since the conflict began in February 2022, there has been a significant surge in the companies established by Russian citizens in Turkey. These companies have aided Russia in circumventing sanctions.  

In a related context, the Grain Deal offers Turkey an opportunity to demonstrate its significance to the US and EU. President Biden does not enjoy a special relationship with Erdogan as President Trump does. In fact, President Biden initially ignored Erdogan on purpose, as he does with Netanyahu in these days. The first significant interaction between Biden and Erdogan occurred when the Turkish government volunteered to secure Kabul airport during the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite being a risky undertaking for any country, Ankara took the opportunity in the hopes of improving relations with Biden. Although the plan did not work due to the disorderly US withdrawal, the conflict in Ukraine presented Ankara with a second chance to underscore its value.

The Grain Deal also serves to promote the image of Turkish grandeur in domestic politics. Turkey’s ambitious expansionism during the second half of the 2010s came to a halt because of its economic crisis and diplomatic isolation. Since 2020, Ankara has been trying to normalize its relations with its regional and global partners – a move that curbs Turkey’s militaristic foreign policy aspirations. Thus, Erdogan’s pivotal role during the negotiations keeps up the self-image that the AKP government promotes. Indeed, for Erdogan, his meeting with Putin was a way to attract attention on the global stage.

The Future of Turkey’s Balancing Policy

Since the beginning of the war, Turkey has pursued a policy of balancing between NATO and Russia. Although it politically and militarily supports Ukraine, it did not give up its economic and political relations with Russia. This policy has thus far yielded dividends for Ankara. Turkey has benefited from the influx of Russian capital fleeing Western markets and has secured favor with the US and EU through its support for Ukraine and its involvement in the Grain Deal. Nevertheless, political pressure mounts on both sides as the conflict escalates. Consequently, maintaining the balancing act will grow increasingly challenging for Ankara.

As a matter of fact, Turkey’s improving relations with the US and EU have already complicated its relationship with Russia. During Ukrainian President Zelensky’s visit to Ankara, Erdogan called for Ukraine’s NATO membership and returned Ukrainian commanders who were in Turkey within the scope of a prisoner exchange deal. This was not an isolated incident but a part of Turkey’s tilt turn towards the West after the elections. Ankara’s change has caused disappointment in Moscow. A Bloomberg analysis depicted Erdogan’s meeting as Ankara’s damage assessment effort. But it will be clearer, in the coming months, how successful Turkey will be in managing both sides.

As the intensity of the conflict exacerbates, NATO and Russia commit more resources to increase their engagement and the level of violence. In this context, Turkey needs to increase its commitment to Ukraine to buttress its war efforts while keeping the gates open for Russia against the sanctions. The question is how long the warring parties will tolerate Turkey’s double play. In recent months, American and European decision-makers have shown eagerness to improve relations with Erdogan. However, their enthusiasm hinges on Turkey's deeper commitment to NATO's struggle against Russia. Yet, Ankara’s attempt to satisfy Western expectations will disappoint the Kremlin and strain Turkish-Russian relations. The coming months may pose greater challenges for Turkey's balancing policy.

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