Syrian rebel forces launched their largest offensive against the Assad government in years on Wednesday, capturing Aleppo and advancing south toward Hama. While it is clear that Ankara had prior knowledge of the Syrian opposition’s offensive, it appears to have underestimated the scale and rapidity of the regime’s collapse in Aleppo. This unforeseen development, coupled with the Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF) withdrawal from Tel Rifaat, will undoubtedly have implications for Turkey’s foreign policy. Ankara is now deliberating the situation, aiming to expand its influence in northern Syria, while mitigating the risk of backlash from Moscow and Tehran.
Turkey is closely observing developments in the region with a combination of satisfaction and concern. The opposition in Idlib, having been confined to the northwesternmost edge of Syria for an extended period, has relied almost entirely on Turkey for its survival. Turkish forces have intervened in the past to halt the advance of Syrian regime forces in order to prevent mass displacements. Furthermore, Ankara has consistently provided training and equipment to opposition factions since the outset of the Syrian civil war. Notably, some of the key weaponry employed by the Syrian opposition in this latest operation, including anti-tank missiles, originates from Turkey.
An operation of this magnitude by the opposition would not have been feasible without Ankara’s implicit consent. Bashar al-Assad's refusal to engage with President Erdoğan to normalize relations may have influenced Ankara’s decision to tacitly approve this operation. However, Ankara likely refrained from openly supporting the Syrian opposition to avoid provoking a direct confrontation with Russia and Iran. In fact, the majority of groups directly controlled by Turkey did not participate in the operation's early stages.
Nonetheless, with the collapse of the Syrian army, Turkey’s proxies in Syria have moved swiftly to claim their share of the spoils in Aleppo. The Syrian National Army (SNA) has launched an operation called “Dawn of Freedom,” focusing on northeastern Aleppo and effectively severing the SDF’s logistical link to Tel Rifaat. Reports indicate that the SDF has withdrawn from Tel Rifaat, leaving the Turkish-backed SNA in control. The SDF is also expected to retreat from additional areas in northern Aleppo.
Following the fall of Tel Rifaat, the SDF’s hold west of the Euphrates is now limited to the Manbij region, which remains a key focus for Ankara. In its first official statement regarding recent developments in Syria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly referenced both Tel Rifaat and Manbij, reiterating the necessity of “ending the terrorist presence” in these areas. Turkey had long declared the crossing of the Euphrates by the SDF as a red line. Nonetheless, previous Turkish military operations in the region have not succeeded in fully eliminating the SDF’s presence west of the river.
For Turkey, the sudden changes in the balance of power provide an opportunity to act against the SDF on the western bank of the Euphrates. Nevertheless, a Turkish military operation targeting Manbij is unlikely in the near term. However, a more limited offensive carried out by the Turkish-backed SNA in Manbij remains a possibility. The United States, the SDF’s primary supporter, has reportedly been reluctant to intervene to prevent potential aggression by Turkey’s Syrian proxies.
On the other hand, efforts to normalize relations between Turkey and Syria now appear to be on hold as Ankara recalibrates its strategy. Given the fluidity of the situation on the ground, Turkey is unlikely to make moves until the battle lines between opposition forces and Assad’s army stabilize.
Managing relations with Russia and Iran will pose a greater challenge for Ankara. Both Moscow and Tehran have attributed the regime’s recent setbacks in Syria to Turkish support for the opposition. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, during a phone call on November 30, emphasized the need for coordinated efforts to stabilize Syria amid escalating tensions in Aleppo and Idlib. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi will visit Ankara on December 2 to discuss the situation in Syria. Turkey’s restrained official reaction and its hesitation to overtly support the SNA’s operations likely reflect a desire to avoid further antagonizing these key regional actors.
The sudden collapse of regime defenses in Aleppo against opposition forces has taken everyone by surprise, including Turkey. Had Ankara anticipated the swift disintegration of regime lines, it might have acted with more caution, especially given the risk of provoking Russia. For now, Turkey is treading carefully, aiming to capitalize on the situation without undermining its strategic partnerships with Russia and Iran.
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