Since the Turkish presidential elections in May, a much friendlier atmosphere has prevailed in Turkish-American relations, as seen at the 2023 NATO Summit at Vilnius. Although this reconciliation hardly means a return to the strategic alliance concept, it is not fully transactional either. Hanging in the air between alliance and transactionalism, the future of Turkish-American relations depends on the course of the war in Ukraine and Turkish support for the Ukrainian cause.
Last week, the World Bank announced a $18 billion loan package for Turkey to support the country’s reconstruction efforts after earthquakes in February. The Biden administration likely played a facilitator role in the decision. The White House also lobbies for congressional approval for the F-16 sales to Turkey if it ratifies Sweden’s accession to NATO.
The diplomatic dynamism between Ankara and Washington also reflects the reconciliation in the relations. The number of high-level diplomatic contacts in the last three years has been higher than the 2010s average. President Biden’s comments criticizing the Turkish government because of authoritarianism and Kurdish rights raised expectations of deterioration in Turkish-American relations. Still, the Turkish-American diplomacy seems more vibrant in his term than the Trump era. Yet, unlike Turkish-Russian diplomacy, which is mainly led by the Erdogan-Putin personal relationship, advisory and ministerial level contacts constitute most of the Turkish-American diplomacy. In 2021 and 2022, Ibrahim Kalin was the one who conducted almost one-third of the meetings with his American counterparts.
Despite the doubts raised by some analysts, Turkish-American relations seemed to thrive during the Biden administration. In parallel with Turkey’s authoritarianism and ambition to pursue an autonomous foreign policy, the Turkish-American ties have undergone a difficult decade that has shaken the foundations of the relations. From a neorealist viewpoint, Putin’s expansionism should have triggered the historical rivalry between Turkey and Russia and facilitated a Turkish-American partnership against the common enemy. Yet, the Turkish government’s ambition to become an independent power center, its anti-western/American sentiments, authoritarian practices, and Erdogan’s opportunism are the main drawbacks of a possible partnership. Therefore, analysts put forward the concept of transactional relations for the future of Turkish-American relations.
Values are definitely not a driving force of relations, but seemingly not formidable obstacles either. In 2021, the Biden administration recognized the Armenian genocide, a red line for Turkey’s foreign policy. Besides, the United States also introduced sanctions against the Turkish ministers, businessmen, and Syrian militia groups close to Turkey. Instead of diplomatic reprisals, the Turkish government chose to turn a blind eye to these moves and weather the issue. In return, the Biden administration seems to accept the authoritarian track of the Erdogan regime.
On the other hand, the Turkish-American relations are not fully transactional either. In parallel with the increasing importance of NATO, the US decision-makers want Turkey to fully commit to the alliance’s policies. So, indeed, from Washington’s perspective, keeping Turkey anchored in the alliance is a strong interest of the United States despite the differences.
NATO’s increasing importance and Turkey’s support for Ukraine keep the Turkish-American relations afloat. Yet, the war’s increasing cost will raise expectations from Ankara – expectations that might be incompatible with Ankara’s balancing policy between the US and Russia. If Turkey maintains its dubious attitude in the war, Turkish-American relations may reach a low point once more.
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